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Are Smart Contracts and Blockchains 
Suitable for Decentralized Railway Control? 
Michael Kuperberg†, Daniel Kindler‡, Sabina Jeschke§ 
Abstract.  Conventional railway operations employ specialized software and 
hardware to ensure safe and secure train operations. Track occupation and signaling 
are governed by central control offices, while trains (and their drivers) receive 
instructions. To make this setup more dynamic, the train operations can be 
decentralized by enabling the trains to find routes and make decisions which are 
safeguarded and protocolled in an auditable manner. In this paper, we present the 
findings of a first-of-its-kind blockchain-based prototype implementation for railway 
control, based on decentralization but also ensuring that the overall system state 
remains conflict-free and safe. We also show how a blockchain-based approach 
simplifies usage billing and enables a train-to-train/machine-to-machine economy. 
Finally, first ideas addressing the use of blockchain as a life-cycle approach for 
condition based monitoring and predictive maintenance in train operations are 
outlined.  
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1. Introduction 
Unlike car traffic, most mainline railway operations have technical frameworks to constantly 
enforce strict safety procedures. These frameworks are designed and implemented to 
withstand an operator’s failure or even death. While the scope of the frameworks differs 
between countries, the state-of-the-art implementations such as ETCS1 include the constant 
upkeep of “safe blocks” (to prevent collisions even in case when one of the trains comes to 
an unexpected stop or derails), emergency braking if a red signal is passed (or if the human 
operator does not react within a specified time), detection of train decomposition, and 
variable speed control. Trainside and lineside IT components work together to achieve these 
goals.  
Beyond the safety-guaranteeing frameworks, railway operation requires live 
dispatching: in addition to schedule-based passenger/freight trains, dispatching must 
accommodate ad-hoc traffic, deviations, construction-caused alterations, equipment 
failures etc. Despite advances in conventional and AI-supported decision making, a lot of 
this work is still performed by humans, i.e. experienced dispatchers. Dispatching and safety 
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2 
frameworks are usually partially decentralized for large railway networks: they are split into 
regions so that size and complexity are manageable – very similar to air traffic control 
operations. Over time, such operations have been electrified, electronical equipment has 
been introduced, and the newest equipment generation relies on digital2, semi-detached 
infrastructure elements (switches, signals, occupancy sensors) as well as on in-cab signaling.  
Dispatching and safety frameworks are complex, heterogenous and very costly (with an 
invest of between 100,000 and 300,000 € per km3), developed over many years and with 
lifecycles of several decades. Despite attempts at standardization, both interoperability and 
vendor lock-in pose an ongoing challenge. Additionally, such frameworks have historically 
been nation-specific; international standards such as ETCS require substantial investment in 
hardware and software during a transition phase. Ultimately, this should help overcome the 
heterogenous patchwork of country-specific standards in place throughout the EU: cross-
border train operation often requires additional training, multi-system vehicles (at a higher 
cost), or changing trains/staff at the border. 
Still, railway traffic management (incl. dispatching and safety/security) is not part of 
ETCS; such functionality is being designed as part of ERTMS4, which is the overall initiative 
that encompasses ETCS and GSM-R. Infrastructure utilization is the key to lower operating 
costs, and customer satisfaction is strongly correlated with punctuality and density of 
service. Thus, some progress has been made on improving track utilization (e.g. using 
“moving blocks”5), in addition to improvements in safety. Despite these advances, the 
principles of railway operations remain largely the same: control center is “the master” and 
the train is “the slave”. This resembles the mainframe design patterns, where the trains are 
only the “terminals”.  
This hub-and-spoke pattern remains in place even for cutting-edge “autonomous train 
operation” 6 . Thus, the mainstream approach is a “slow evolution”, mandated by the 
backward compliance in large networks but also by the intrinsic interests of the 
manufacturers and investors. However, there are situations where seamless train-to-
infrastructure and train-to-train contracting would lead to improvements: trains could 
dynamically negotiate and “sell” a timeslot, automating redispatching in a rational, market-
driven way. Potentially, passengers can request unscheduled stops (and bid/pool for them), 
and unpredicted construction or extension of maintenance shutdown periods could be 
propagated across the network. Additionally, trains could self-report operation-impacting 
defects (such as overheated axle bearings or derailments).  
Another potential for improvements exists in the “back office” area: many national rail 
networks provide “open access” to competing passenger and freight railways, which pay 
regulated fees for infrastructure usage (tracks, stations, energy supply). Likewise, the “back 
office” sells ahead-of-time access rights since network access is strictly controlled to enable 
timetabled train operations to maintain their quality of service. Using a blockchain, both the 
sale/allocation of access resp. usage rights and the actual payment for them would happen 
transactionally and instantly, in one system rather than in several. In the area of 
maintenance and servicing, currently, maintenance windows, maintenance intervals, and 
maintenance plans are designed to ensure the safety of the system. The use of blockchain 
coupled with the ever-evolving sensor technology of trains or infrastructure components 
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can be seen as the basis of modern maintenance, in which the individual components 
independently register their requirements. The rollout of such on-demand maintenance 
then includes e.g. also the automatic ordering of spare parts or the provision of special 
teams. 
In Figure 1, we show the most essential parts of this “ecosystem”. Each shown part exists 
in several instances: there are sovereign rail networks both at national level and regional 
levels. In reality, there are additional layers (e.g. procurement, malus/bonus processing, HR, 
maintenance planning and management, construction, governmental oversight, insurance) 
which we do not detail here. Ultimately, we are working towards a modular, API-driven 
multi-modal “Transportation Operating System” where all interactions (from ticket 
purchase to subcontractor payments) are handled on the basis of a consistent, trusted, 
replicated ledger “data base”. Some of the functionality shown there has already been 
showcased by us in previous works: e.g. blockchain-based station usage billing 7  and 
blockchain-based revenue sharing 8 . Throughout these modules, privacy, reliability and 
performance (throughput, latency) remain an ongoing challenge.  
In this paper, we investigate a disruptive approach to train control based on Distributed 
Ledger Technologies (DLTs) that thoroughly rethinks the involved roles: a DLT becomes the 
trusted “single truth” for both the current state of the networks and for the “future 
infrastructure reservations” which are the results of pre-scheduling and ad-hoc planning. 
The ledger data is replicated across ledger nodes, providing fault tolerance and reliability. 
Furthermore, smart contracts serve as “gatekeepers” to the state changes (e.g. new 
reservations or cancellations) and the participating nodes cross-verify these changes, 
implementing a consensus mechanism that ensures consistency with specified rules - across 
Figure 1: some IT building blocks in deregulated passenger train operations 
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4 
nodes. We show how a prototype implementation works, and where additional research is 
needed. As part of the paper, we discuss the challenges to this approach, and compare it to 
existing implementations. We also show how it can be developed to a modular 
“Transportation Operating System”.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 shows the full complexity 
of the problem and how we have defined the scope for the initial proof-of-concept (which 
was implemented using a training facility used by Deutsche Bahn AG). Section 3 presents 
the architecture of the solution and explains the choice of the used technologies. Section 4 
describes some important implementation aspects (incl. the use of the Ethereum blockchain 
stack) and the ‘lessons learned’ that we gathered during the PoC. Section 5 analyzes related 
work and how it compares to our results. Section 6 concludes and provides an outlook, 
together with the planned next steps.  
 
2. Work objective, scope definition and assumptions 
Our research objective is to enable trains (resp. train operators) and infrastructure 
elements to be first-level, active and self-aware participants in railway control systems. 
Active participation by vehicles builds on access to a trustworthy, up-to-date view of the 
network use - past, current and planned. Such active participation includes wayfinding (both 
ad-hoc and in-advance), booking and actual usage of the infrastructure, as well as 
interaction with lineside equipment (e.g. setting a switch into the correct position) and with 
other vehicles. As part of our objective, we want to establish an authoritative data 
repository that is audit-proof/tamper-proof (through write-once-read-many semantics, aka 
WORM) and which relies on open-source, security-assessed COTS software components 
rather than on proprietary technology.  
The write access to the data repository is to be protected by “gatekeepers”, which 
ensure that only secure entries can be inserted (e.g. no two trains are located in the same 
block at the same time). The WORM semantics mean that data cannot be overwritten (not 
even by consensus). Some nodes may choose to store only a certain, regulation-imposed 
backlog of past data to keep the data amount manageable.  
Train localization and integrity checks (detection of decomposition) are assumed to be 
available; there exist established technologies for this (such as trackside equipment, GNSS, 
Differential GPS9 resp. axle counters10). Trainside safety/security measures (such as a forced 
emergency stop when trying to enter an occupied block) would access the state information 
(e.g. block occupancy) stored in the proposed, new system - currently, such information is 
transmitted by trackside equipment/IT (e.g. LZB, magnets in PZB/Indusi) resp. by GSM-R (as 
in ETCS Level 3). Therefore, the physical reality and the IT representation are matched: the 
infrastructure elements and the trains have “IoT digital twins”.  
It is imperative that a digital twin and its physical counterpart are “mutually reliable” for 
both state representation and state changes. For example, the physical switch must be 
reliably “locked” except during state changes, and may not change its position without 
having been instructed by the digital twin to do so. If a switch position is modified by brute 
force (e.g. through sabotage), the malfunction must be detected (e.g. by an appropriate 
circuitry) and the disruption must be represented in the IoT digital twin, preventing an 
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accident. We assume in the following that infrastructure elements and the synchronization 
between the IT representation and the physical entity is available and reliable, i.e. solved 
outside of our work.  
Likewise, we assume that the trainside safety aspects of the (automated or human-
operated) train operation are maintained. However, they information they rely upon are 
not provided by the centralized control center, but rather by the blockchain-based network. 
For example, trainside emergency stop is auto-activated if a train enters an occupied block.  
It is a part of our approach that a train pays the infrastructure usage directly to the 
infrastructure element (e.g. to a track stretch). This means that the infrastructure element 
has a way to receive payments, and its owner can administrate those payments. Payments 
can also be bonuses (or fines), or “back office” tasks as in Figure 1. To enable such a M2M 
economy, we propose to use blockchain wallets (which are effectively PKI keypairs, cf. 
Ethereum), where the balance of a wallet is stored on the blockchain ledger. In this paper, 
we do not discuss how the payment is integrated into the planning/management/control 
processes.  
3. Solution Architecture and Employed Technologies 
Conventional train control systems are usually centralized in two ways: logically and 
technically. Logically, there is just one business entity (the “infrastructure operator”) 
running the control system, and it is the only party that has full access rights (incl. write 
permissions); it may or may not allow read-only access for train operators at its own 
discretion. Technically, the control system is usually centralized because cost factors do not 
encourage a multi-node/multi-location setup. Additionally, a “hot standby” or even “active-
active” setup means that data must be replicated successfully and completely before it can 
be considered as “written through”; this may increase latency and strain the data links 
between the locations.  
Increasingly, infrastructure malfunctions lead to compensation claims from the train 
operators, which themselves have to pay compensations for delays to customers. This forms 
a monetary driver for further fault tolerance in railways operations; additionally, the 
ongoing progress in hardware performance-to-cost ratio encourages the “design for 
failover” approach even in the light of the additional implementation costs compared to the 
simple setup.  
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Therefore, our architecture (as shown in Figure 2) is primarily based on technical 
decentralization, i.e. on multiple nodes. The blockchain identity of the train is the actor 
which orders paths (i.e. performs reservations of an infrastructure element for a given 
timeframe); it interacts with the blockchain identity of the infrastructure element via the 
smart contract which is the gatekeeper (ensuring consistency and a safe global state). The 
smart contract is the entity which changes the “should be” part of global state. When it 
comes to the “is” global state, the physical world is the “leading truth”; the state on the 
blockchain is mirroring the “physical truth”. The train protection component does rely on 
the “is-state” but consults the future state as well.  
When it comes to logical decentralization, the situation is more intricate. Logical 
decentralization means that the nodes belong to multiple parties. This immediately poses 
the questions of authority, agreements, responsibility and liability. When it comes to 
security and human life, strong authorities are the traditional choice. Implicitly, a single 
authority means a single (central) responsibility. In aviation, the pilot and the co-pilot are an 
example where strict rules of authority in a multi-party setup are used to prevent a 
stalemate (standoff), as there is no arbiter to act as an intermediary between the parties.  
Logical decentralization is inherently more complex than logical centralization, as it 
needs to address the situation with failing/unreachable nodes, the meaning of dissenting 
minorities, party splitting and unstable behavior (cf. the “Byzantine generals” problems and 
the associated body of research). At the same time, large-scale networks with decentralized 
decision-making have appeared and maintained operation, e.g. the public Bitcoin and the 
public Ethereum blockchains. Such networks succeed in horizontal scaling, a working set of 
rules for consensus (which is a systematic decision-making using defined majority rules), and 
in fault tolerance. At the same time, achieving suitable QoS and performance (latency, 
throughput, predictability) while maintaining scalability remains challenging in 
decentralized DLTs and blockchains.  
Figure 2: architecture of the prototype 
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Ultimately, our solution architecture is technically suitable for both logically centralized 
and logically decentralized setups: since we use a private-consortial (non-public) blockchain 
as the “engine” to run our algorithms and store our data, additional nodes can be added 
and additional parties can be onboarded. Note that for our architecture, there is no need 
for separate “oracles” that supply externally-sourced information. For timer-triggered 
events (e.g. checking whether a reserved element can be released since the reservation has 
expires and the train has vacated the element), reliable solutions are rather straightforward 
to implement.  
It is important to stress that reservations (and payments) are handled in a peer-to-peer 
fashion between trains and infrastructure elements (such as switches); the IoT twin of the 
infrastructure element is in control of the element’s blockchain wallet. Blockchain, on the 
other side, is the event bus and the recording ledger, but it is not a first-level, self-aware, 
individually-acting entity with own interest. At the same time, the participants of the 
blockchain network safeguard the outcome of the peer-to-peer transactions, because these 
transactions (e.g. admitting a train into a track section) are security-relevant and affect all 
peers – not just two. 
State changes on a blockchain consists of several steps. Independently of the used 
technology, the three core steps on the “happy path” are transaction proposal, transaction 
validation and the replication of the validated transaction; there might also be technology-
specific steps such as ordering of the transactions. The transaction validation is the most 
intricate step: it is where “mining” could be included to combat spamming resp. to introduce 
incentives to “compute” the block. In our situation (private network), transaction validation 
is the trust-intensive step. The important design question to answer here is: how many 
network participants have to vote in favor of a transaction to validate it? The possible 
answers re “at least n” (n1), “at least 51% of all participants” etc. Our architecture is very 
flexible w.r.t. the validation algorithm, and we have employed Proof-of-Work (with minimal 
complexity), Proof-of-Authority and also Proof-of-Stake, while adjusting the consensus 
thresholds.  
For the implementation of the state-keeping and of the smart contracts, we used the 
open-source Ethereum blockchain (geth) in a private/consortial setup, as described in the 
next section. 
4. The Prototype Implementation of the Blockchain-based Control Core 
To validate our approach, we looked for a physical system that would be as close as 
possible to a real-life mainline railway. At the PoC stage, using a real railway would incur 
risks that could affect human lives, and a “secluded” full-stale test setup was not available. 
As a replacement, the Darmstadt training facility for infrastructure operators 
(“Eisenbahnbetriebsfeld Darmstadt” near Frankfurt am Main, known as EBD, cf. Figure 3) 
was a very good opportunity:  
• The facility is a long-standing joint venture between a research university 
(Technische Universität Darmstadt) and the Deutsche Bahn AG (resp. its DB Netz AG 
subsidiary) 
• EBD is actively being used for academic teaching and railway research, having been 
employed in a significant number of projects11 
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• The EBD includes different generations of railway control equipment (from 
mechanical to electronical), so it is clear which functionality of it our approach would 
replace  
• The facility includes a large, complex model railway layout that is fully digital and 
includes a variety of train material, working signals and switches, as well as “section 
occupation” information as well as “vehicle location” functionality (both can be used 
through documented APIs and over established network protocols) 
• The existing security/safety/localization software and hardware in the EBD would 
remain as-is for our undertaking, while the train control and dispatching were to be 
engineered using blockchain technology, following the architecture described above.  
 
We have decided in favor of the ready-to-use EBD and the against a custom-made scale 
model railway even though the model railway would be transportable and thus better 
suitable for on-premise demonstrations. The reason to start with the EBD is that the 
reproducibility and trustworthiness of our results from the perspective of domain specialists 
(both non-IT and IT) is strengthened when using a validated, established third-party setup 
as a foundation. Our implementation supplies train control and dispatching functionality 
that works “on top of” the EBD-provided interfaces. Our contribution includes additional 
detailed checks not performed by the EBD software itself: e.g. we ensure that switches are 
always in the correct position.  
As the EBD is a scale model of the current, centralized mode of railway operations, the 
EBD’s model locomotives cannot be active participants of the blockchain-based approach: 
they do not have computing power or communication facilities, even for lightweight API-
Figure 3: EBD validation setup (excerpt of the railway layout) 
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based access to blockchain nodes. In fact, even the trainside safety aspects (such as 
emergency full-stop if a red signal is passed) are virtualized inside the EBD by the central 
control logic of the model railway. To enable humans (i.e. train drivers) to “reserve” paths 
(i.e. necessary sequences of infrastructure elements for the specified time), we provide a 
graphical UI which visualizes every step, from wayfinding over payment to the actual usage. 
For automated operation, the underlying input (departure and arrival - points and times) 
may be provided by passengers or by operators from the train-owning railway undertaking.  
In this context, by now one known disadvantage of using Ethereum is that “out of the 
box”, it is an unpermissioned (permissionless) blockchain: theoretically, everyone (within the 
consortium) is free to set up one or several nodes and to participate and potentially, every 
participant (and every node) is equal-righted. Technically, there is no PKI-based 
authentication and authorization in Ethereum (e.g. unlike in Hyperledger Fabric), leading to 
anonymity/pseudonymity.  
However, there are two levels of protection in place for our implementation: the 
network-level protection restricts access to nodes based on a whitelist. Additionally, at the 
level of smart contracts and assets, Ethereum’s concepts and the Solidity language for smart 
contracts provide built-in mechanisms of ownership, delegation, and custom-defined 
permissions for custom-defined assets and contracts.  
For the initial implementation, we have chosen Ethereum over e.g. Hyperledger Fabric 
because of the built-in wallet functionality and because there are ready-to-use 
implementations of Proof-of-Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS) and Proof-of-Authority 
(PoA) consensus algorithms. At the same time, we fully understand that the privacy-
preserving concept of “channels” (e.g. in Hyperledger Fabric) is more suitable, and 
blockchain-native tokens and assets can be added to most ledger implementation. Other 
products may also provide more choices w.r.t. programming languages for smart contracts, 
while Solidity is the only smart contract programming language available in Ethereum. As 
other ledger technologies (e.g. Hashgraph, R3 Corda, Hyperledger Burrow, Neo, …) mature, 
we will re-evaluate this choice.  
The UML sequence diagram in Figure 4 shows the steps involved in a successful 
reservation of a multi-resource travel path. The release of the infrastructure elements can 
be “as quick as possible” (as soon as the train has passed them, which improves efficiency), 
or can be triggered later (incl. “implicit release” when the reservation expires, provided that 
there is no active usage of the infrastructure element).  
The route-finding on throughput-constrained, weighted/priced and time-aware graphs 
is already solved by several libraries and products. In our approach, the current and future 
reservation are stored on a distributed ledger; at the time of writing, there were no libraries 
that would expose such route-finding functionality directly on ledger-stored graphs. Thus, 
we have used a rather simple JavaScript library for finding potential routes, but JGraphT12 is 
one of the more elaborate candidates. Available routes (a subset of potentially possible 
routes) are then determined on the basis of the ledger-stored reservations.  
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Both the graph search and the subsequent reservation are subject to transactional 
concern such as atomicity, consistency, isolation and optimistic/pessimistic locking. For 
example, if the set of the potential routes (which are found by a train) is not locked, there is 
a probability that another train will book a part of that potential route. Then, by the time 
that the initial train decides to book a potential route, it may have become unavailable.  
Such problems are not DLT-specific and solved in different ways (optimistic, speculative, 
pessimistic, time-constrained locking) in existing systems. To keep our prototype 
implementation simple, we did not implement pessimistic transaction locking but instead 
act in an optimistic way: we accept the possibility of a “booking failure” if the selected 
potential route has become unavailable in between (some or all segments, that is). In such 
a case, the wayfinding and reservation attempts are simply repeated.  
Likewise, for the initial implementation iteration, we chose to live with possible side 
effects of non-atomic behavior, when a route with multiple resources is booked: if the first 
Figure 4: sequence diagram of the path reservation logic (excerpt, simplified view) 
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resource booking(s) succeed but a following resource booking fails, the already-booked 
segments of the chosen route are “released” (un-reserved). Then, the train has to re-try 
again.  
Including locking and transactionality into the booking contract is of course possible, but 
we decided to do it once the technology stack for the next version of the approach has been 
re-evaluated: we are investigating ledgers such as Hyperledger Fabric, R3 Corda and others 
because they offer sub-groups (“channels”) so that not all information is broadcast to every 
node in the network.  
Railway-operating software is subject to strict norms (e.g. EN 50128, 50129) and SIL 
(safety integrity level) procedures. In addition to rigorous testing, formal verification may be 
required to prove the suitability of both platform components and application components, 
as a prerequisite to certification. These tasks will be part of our future work.  
Some Blockchain implementations do not prohibit or (as Ethereum) even explicitly 
support forks: branches which make the ledger a non-linear, tree-like structure. A fork marks 
a “split” where state changes are non-serialized and two branches can contain two 
conflicting statements about the same item. Forks can be intentional 13 ; but fork-like 
situations can also happen if the network splits in two parts with no interconnections 
between them: each network part develops its own version of the ledger. Obviously, forks 
(resp. a nonlinear blockchain without consistency checks) bring the risk of ambiguity – 
something that must be avoided in train control. 
When we chose Ethereum for the prototype implementation, we were aware of the 
possibility of forks on the public ledger – and even as we are using a consortial, non-public 
setup, network partitioning cannot be fully excluded. As part of our future work, we plan to 
conduct a deeper evaluation of other DLT technologies and products, and avoidance of forks 
as well as the detection/avoidance of network partitions will be a key evaluation criterion. 
While the Ethereum blockchain has the “replicate everything on each full node” 
principle, it is possible to reduce the data load (e.g. through sharding) and participants can 
use asymmetric cryptography to encrypt private information passed over an unencrypted 
medium (DLT), given that the public keys (for the encryption part) are already available as 
part of the wallet. Other enterprise-grade DLT/Blockchain stacks (such as Hyperledger Fabric 
from the Linux Foundation) offer further facilities for privacy scoping, e.g. channels.  
5. Related work 
Decentralization in railway control has been addressed in multi-agent research (14, 15 and 
others), incl. comparisons of performance between centralized and decentralized scenarios. 
However, these approaches have neither used a tamper-proof, transparent ruleset (as the 
Ethereum smart contracts that we used), nor did they use a tamper-proof “full history” 
approach (as we do with the Ethereum-based distributed ledger/blockchain). Beyond the 
concepts, none of these approaches has been validated in a real-world training facility.  
Outside the railway industry, autonomous vehicles are currently not able to pay for their 
infrastructure usage (such as tolled highways, bridges, or parking facilities) “on their own” 
(in an unsupervised manner). While there are proofs-of-concepts16 and interest groups17 
with the focus of car-to-infrastructure payments, they are neither targeting ahead-of-time 
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reservations nor do they cover limited-access, restricted-capacity infrastructure that is the 
cornerstone of railway operations.  
Our approach includes the enablement of trains to establish trade relationships with 
each other, e.g. to enable unsupervised monetary compensation from a delayed express 
train to a freight train when the latter yields its priority so that the express train can reduce 
its delay. The communication part of this vision can be compared to “car-to-car 
communication” 18, which relies on technologies such as 5G. In contrast to such work, our 
contribution focuses on the protocols and on the contents of such M2M communication; 
strictly speaking, the blockchain and its consensus introduces an intermediary layer.  
Using blockchains (or distributed ledgers) for machine-to-machine payments has been 
studied and demonstrated on several occasions. This is encouraged by the native (crypto-) 
currency capabilities and token concepts of the underlying technologies, such as ERC20 in 
the Ethereum ecosystem or NEP-519 in NEO. Still, none of these approaches proposes or 
even implements the solution to the systemic constraints of mainline railway operations.  
Non-DLT solutions for WORM data storage include dedicated hardware 20  and 
software/cloud21 designs, modifications of existing file systems22, or data archival23. Some 
database products support replication and “hot standby” / “cold standby” modes24, usually 
with a cluster-based distribution. In a similar way, Master Data Management systems25 are 
concerned with data replication and synchronization. These solution types incur a vendor 
lock-in (due to proprietary software) and are subject to the “deleted by the master 
administrator” problem. Additionally, they do not scale across enterprises, across thousands 
of nodes, and do not provide the auditability of the “rule source code” and “rule execution” 
as is the case with the blockchains/DLTs. 
Our vision includes “sovereign” infrastructure elements such as switches which are 
adhering to the ledger rules and events (from smart contracts). There are different 
approaches to build railway IT infrastructure in a more networked/peer-to-peer way26. 
However, none of them covers M2M payments and train-to-train economy.  
More modern paradigms to switch controls and automated dispatching are to be found 
in “turnkey” systems for urban/suburban networks27, often with CBTC28 (communication-
based train control). These networks have central management facilities which control both 
trains and infrastructure in an integrated way, incl. peak traffic management and ad-hoc 
addition of trains. However, so far, none of such systems has been applied as “in-place 
upgrade” to a mainline network, as this would require large-scale adaptation of trains and 
infrastructure and also the (costly) coexistence of the “old” and “new” systems, as larger 
networks cannot be upgraded in one “big bang” step.  
A certain overlap with our approach can be found in newer signaling and control systems 
such as ETCS1, where the train is more aware of its surroundings. However, even with ETCS, 
the physical train is obtaining certain constraints (maximum speed, …) in a passive way and 
for safety reasons, the human train driver can only operate within those constraints.  
From the economist’s perspective, our proposal can be classified as a “decentralized 
transparent free market economy with strict rule enforcement”, whereas the existing 
mainline approach is more “centralized market economy with central resource allocation in 
a non-discriminatory manner” (in Germany, the deregulated railway ecosystem includes a 
regulatory/oversight authority which is tasked with ensuring the open-access policy set 
forth in the law). There is a substantial body of work investigating the (dis-)advantages of 
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central coordination in comparison with decentral, “peer-to-peer” trading. However, such 
research is rarely applicable to the allocation of scarce resources (as it is the case in mainline 
railways) in combination with safety constraints that are inherently complex to include in a 
market model/simulation.  
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we have introduced blockchain-based decentralized railway control and its 
prototype implementation, which combines traditional safety principles with cutting-edge 
IT technology. Trains can determine possible routes and book them directly (both ad-hoc 
and in advance), based on transparent and binding smart contracts which ensure conflict-
free resource booking. At the same time, our approach coexists with centralized batch 
planning that produces long-term timetable and which integrates pre-planned construction 
sites - across railway undertakings. 
As the ledger lists all binding recordings of the current status and the advance 
reservations, a train-to-train economy without the risk of double-spending, deniability or 
repudiation can be established. The trains, infrastructure elements or other vehicles can 
participate in the asset exchange in an autonomous way, or using “human proxies” from the 
train-operating companies resp. staff; the machines become proactive members of the 
transportation network. Essential parts of the specialized hardware, software and 
infrastructure – interlocking, signals and control centers – can be streamlined, merged and 
redesigned to be more fault-tolerant.  
In combination with the ledger immutability and the unambiguous assignment of actions 
and assets to an identity, a virtual but trusted identity and a trusted curriculum vitae (CV) 
can be created and traced. Every part of the ecosystem (whether static or moving) becomes 
identifiable and possesses a history. Such data opens up new opportunities, e.g. in digital 
and predictive maintenance and in cross-enterprise asset exchange. Also, certain necessary 
administrative processes can be greatly simplified by using the virtual wallet for immediate 
monetary transactions. Vehicle usage and infrastructure services can be billed 
automatically; charges and reservation fees are paid seamlessly step by step, in the same 
system. Switches and other track elements as participants of the blockchain can receive 
payments. 
The prototype implementation has proven that the concept is viable, as demonstrated 
by the in the EBD training facility control center in Darmstadt. As the next steps, we plan to 
employ the blockchain in combination with multi-agent systems (MAS) and IoT middleware 
to study the effectiveness of our blockchain-based, autonomic peer-to-peer economy for 
the railway operations. Aspects such as the trading of priorities, additional stops for 
ensuring trip connections and passenger transfer, surge pricing, international journeys or 
seamless on-demand offers in passenger and freight transport are on our agenda.  
Another vector of our interests is a trial with full-scale real-life equipment, e.g. in 
marshalling yards with remote-controllable unmanned mini-shunters or on secondary lines 
with manageable complexity and little traffic. The focus would be to bring the entire 
approach into an operational state and to investigate scalability and performance. For this 
scenario, we aim at a close interaction and collaboration with the government-devised 
regulation authorities.  
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In parallel to the use of blockchain for decentralized control models, the power of the 
method in railway operation lies in the field of maintenance and service. These tasks are 
highly labor-intensive, cost-intensive and time-consuming. A huge number of existing delays 
and other shortcomings are directly or indirectly attributable to this area. A comprehensive 
digitization of this field includes - in addition to the sensory recording of the states of all 
components in real time - the proof of the execution of repairs and maintenance as well as 
the documentation and traceability of the single steps. The digital twin of a train or the 
digital twin of a component of the infrastructure is therefore time-dependent. Its dynamics 
can be understood as an autogenerated CV of the corresponding component realized by 
blockchain. 
In addition to Ethereum, other frameworks and consensus mechanisms will be evaluated 
and, if necessary, integrated based on specific requirements (such as robustness against 
network partitioning). Also, we plan to study whether using state channels (to reduce the 
workload on the chain) would be suitable without compromising safety, security and 
reliability.  
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